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UPPOSE THREE PEOPLE ARE ABOUT TO DROWN – one on 
your left and the other two on your far right. You can easily go on a 
rescue with your boat. But, unfortunately, there is not sufficient time to 
save all. Faced with the choice between (a) saving person A and letting per-
sons B and C die, and (b) saving B and C while letting A die, what should 
you do? John Taurek (1977) argued that you should flip a coin to decide 
whom to save so as to give each individual an equal chance of being rescued, 
thereby showing equal and positive respect to each. For, as he sees it, there is 
no impersonal perspective to or for which the death of two is twice as worse 
than that of one, and thus no particular reason to favor the larger group over 
the smaller one. Although based on a moral conviction that is widely recog-
nized, this conclusion has caused a sense of unease to many, whose intuition 
is that we ought to save the two. Many consequentialists can offer a straight-
forward rationale for the intuition by appealing to interpersonal aggregation. 
But many other philosophers have attempted to provide a justification for, if 
anything, the duty to save the greater number without combining the utilities 
and claims of separate individuals and thus opening the door to the tyranny 
of the majority. 
Among them is Iwao Hirose (2001, 2004: 68-70 and 2015: 161-67)1 who 
put forward a non-aggregative argument for saving the greater number as a 
variant of Frances Kamm’s “Aggregation Argument” (1993: 85-87). The 
whole structure of his argument unfolds as follows: 
 
(1) The state of affairs where the greater number is saved is better than the one 
where the fewer number is. 
(2) It is at least prima facie right to bring about the best consequence. 
∴ It is right to save the greater number. 
 
One might find this argument curious because it does not look different 
from the standard consequentialist argument for saving the greater number. 
In fact, Hirose himself admitted to importing the consequentialist element 
into his argument in order to bridge the goodness of a consequence and the 
rightness of an action to bring it about (2015: 166). But its consequentialist 
hue need not involve aggregation, and this is exactly how Hirose’s argument 
distinguishes itself from the standard consequentialist one. The non-
aggregative nature of it lies in the way he makes the case for premise (1), not 
in the rejection of premise (2). 
                                                
1 The three references contain nearly the same idea. I refer only to Hirose (2015) hereafter, 
as it is the most detailed and updated presentation of his view. 
S 
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In this paper, I do not take issue with premise (2); instead, I tackle the 
method Hirose employs to establish the truth of premise (1). While the 
method itself does succeed in doing so, I contend, Hirose fails to show that 
we have reason to adopt it – thus to be moved by his argument overall. In 
order to see how he sets forth premise (1) without relying on aggregation, 
consider first the following two non-aggregative principles for value judg-
ments: 
 
Impartiality: two alternatives are equally good if they differ only with regard to the 
identities of the people. 
 
Pareto: if one alternative is better for some person and worse for no one than an-
other alternative, then it is better than the other. 
 
He claimed that the conjunction of these two can determine the state of af-
fairs in which B and C are alive while A is dead to be clearly better than the 
one in which A is alive but B and C are dead in an aggregation-free manner. 
Now consider the following three possible states of affairs: 
 
X : (saved, dead, dead) 
Y : (dead, saved, dead) 
Z : (dead, saved, saved) 
 
The three elements in each ordered triple represent the states of A, B and C, 
respectively. Hirose argues that Y is, by Impartiality, equally as good as X, 
and that Z is, by Pareto, better than Y, and, therefore, Z is better than X – 





I begin by asking what reason we have for applying Impartiality and Pareto in 
the same way Hirose did. When one uses two different yardsticks that give 
him different answers, he has to use them with discipline, unless he is to be 
accused of arbitrarily applying a double standard. He needs, in other words, a 
higher-order principle to regulate the uses of the yardsticks for the double 
standard to be benignly applied. Impartiality and Pareto are two such yard-
sticks. In the first phase, it is Impartiality that tells us that X = Y. But Pareto 
disagrees. In the second, Pareto confidently declares that Y < Z. But Impar-
tiality remains rather uncertain. Why should we listen to Impartiality this time 
and Pareto that time? What are the circumstances under which we shall use 
Impartiality and Pareto? Hirose is silent on these questions. So, let me try 
using his yardsticks in a different way than he did. 
X and Y are, by Pareto, simply beyond comparison, for neither is Pare-
to-superior nor Pareto-inferior to the other. X is better for some and worse 
for some other than Y, and vice versa. Impartiality cannot determine that Y 
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and Z are equally good, let alone which one of them, if either, is better than 
the other. For they are different in respect to factors other than the identities 
of the people involved, i.e., the number of those who survive and those who 
do not. Therefore, X and Y, and Y and Z are incomparable. A direct juxtapo-
sition of X and Z would not help: they are incomparable as well either by 
Impartiality or Pareto. That X < Z is not demonstrated. 
My own “reversed” use of Impartiality and Pareto does not provide a 
definite answer in this case as to whether two different states of affairs are 
equally good, or as to which, if either, is better. But does this fact alone give 
us reason to prefer Hirose’s particular way of using them to mine? I think 
not. Suppose you are a member of the Admissions Committee of a conserva-
toire. Given only a single lot for admission, the committee has finally nar-
rowed down the pool of applicants to two. Both are genius vocalists. One is 
fascinating in these aspects and the other in those aspects. You invite them 
to display a wide variety of performances and conduct a series of interviews 
over and over again so you can identify the best student, but only in vain. 
You find yourself unable to determine if they are equally good, or, if not, 
which one is better. Would you, for this reason, consult a karaoke machine? I 
do not think that its ability to give you a clear-cut answer about their perfor-
mances provides you with any reason to adopt it as a criterion to evaluate 
them. It seems much more reasonable to conclude that the values of their 
talents and potential as musicians are incomparable (and to suspend judg-
ment) than to let a karaoke machine be the judge no matter how sophisticat-
ed it is. Seeking an answer from a karaoke machine with no independent rea-
son for doing so would be foolish. Insisting upon Hirose’s use of Impartiality 
and Pareto is not much different. 
It might be objected that we do have an independent reason to adopt 
Hirose’s use of Impartiality and Pareto: we should save someone. Just as Buri-
dan’s ass has reason not to starve to death, we have reason to execute the 
rescue mission before everyone dies. My use of Impartiality and Pareto, how-
ever, forces us into a quandary. My opponents might contend that I would 
merely stand back and watch the drowning people become food for fish. 
This is unacceptable. 
I do not deny the idea that we surely must save someone. My application 
of Impartiality and Pareto does not tell us whom to save, but it does not tell us 
to refrain from taking any action, either. We must break the tie, and this 
seems to be what we have most reason to do. But why not do so by a coin 
toss, if indeterminacy is the problem? Buridan’s ass need not conclusively de-
termine which pile of hay is better. What she needs in order to avoid starva-
tion is to eat some pile of hay, not necessarily the best pile of it. For her, there 
is no reason not to choose a coin toss as a decision-making procedure. In-
deed, it seems much more reasonable to toss a coin in the conservatoire audi-
tion case as well than to make the gifted sing into karaoke microphones. 
Why, then, do we not have reason to flip a coin in the rescue case? Why 
should we utilize Impartiality and Pareto in a particular sequence? Confront-
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ed with two groups of people of different sizes in peril, are we in an entirely 
different situation? What is it in virtue of which we come to have reason to 
use the Hirosean method? If Hirose invokes the mere fact that his method 
confirms that saving more (Z) is better than saving fewer (X), then he simply 
begs the question – especially against the number skeptics such as Taurek. I 




One might suggest that Hirose’s application of Impartiality and Pareto may 
be put into other terms that do not invite my objection: 
 
Anonymous Pareto: if one alternative is better for some person and worse for no 
one than another alternative or its permutation – where a permutation of a state of 
affairs is one that is identical to it except that the levels of well-being are attributed 
to different persons – then it is better than the other. 
 
Since Z is Pareto-superior to permutations of X, that is, X* (dead, saved, 
dead) or X** (dead, dead, saved), it is anonymously Pareto-superior to X. 
Therefore, Z is, by Anonymous Pareto, better than X (see Otsuka 2006: 121-
23).2 
Before asking why we are to adopt Anonymous Pareto, I briefly touch 
upon whether we have good reason to adopt Impartiality and Pareto individu-
ally.3 Some would reject Pareto as they attach importance to distributive con-
cerns in making value judgments. Consider a variant of the case in question, 
where A is so feeble that he would catch a terribly bad cold even if eventually 
rescued, while B and C are excellent swimmers who can survive without aid, 
although they would then suffer a cold of the same intensity. The following 
are possible states of affairs: 
 
U : (dead, sick, sick) 
V : (sick, sick, sick) 
W : (dead, well, well) 
 
Both V and W are Pareto-superior to U, meaning that it is, by Pareto, better 
to do something than to do nothing. Neither, however, is Pareto-superior 
nor Pareto-inferior to the other. In this case, therefore, Pareto does not dis-
criminate between V and W at all. But many telic egalitarians, prioritarians 
and sufficientarians would plausibly complain that W is worse than V be-
cause it condones an intolerable inequality, neglects the already worse off and 
                                                
2 Anonymous Pareto might seem identical to the conjunction of Impartiality and Pareto 
applied in a manner that always avoids the suspension of value judgments. There is, however, 
at least one respect in which they differ: in contrast to Anonymous Pareto, the conjunction 
of Impartiality and Pareto enables us to find some pairs of two states of affairs to be equally 
good. 
3 I am grateful to the anonymous JESP reviewer for inviting me to attend to this point. 
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fails to ensure that everyone has enough. Pareto is simply indifferent to such 
considerations of equality, priority and sufficiency. 
Impartiality may also be questioned by those who disapprove teleologi-
cal understandings of value. For instance, they may reject that X = Y on the 
ground that value resides not in states of affairs, but in choices that bring 
them about. How on earth, they ask, can saving the lone individual (X) – 
perhaps as per a tossed coin – be just as good as saving only one person on 
the other side while leaving the other lost at sea who could also be saved at 
little extra cost (Y)? Once good is understood as choiceworthy, X and Y can-
not be of equal value (Lübbe 2008; cf. Otsuka 2004: 417-20). But even when 
these cases that prima facie speak against our adopting Impartiality and Pare-
to in the first place are set aside, we may still inquire into what reasons there 
are for us to hold them jointly – namely, to introduce anonymity into Pareto. 
Let us first consider what reason we have for adopting Pareto. Its prima-
ry virtue is that it never finds any change to a state of affairs good so long as 
it involves sacrifices on the part of a person. No single individual is demand-
ed to bear costs in the name of the overall goodness. In this way, Pareto pro-
vides an “axiological” protection on each. But bringing in anonymity to Pare-
to is just giving up this virtue. Since the protection is for individuals, not 
groups of them, the identities of persons certainly matter. Anyone who ap-
plies Pareto needs to ask who benefits and who loses. Once their identities 
are cloaked, however, the protection is no longer available. I do not see why 
anyone who is moved by the virtue of Pareto would adopt the anonymous 





What we are in search of is not merely a logically possible method that can 
determine whether saving more (Z) is better than saving fewer (X). Conceiv-
ably, there are tons of such methods, and we are to find one that we have 
good reason to adopt. Perhaps Hirose’s application of Impartiality and Pare-
to (or Anonymous Pareto) outshines many other methods, for it is simple 
and free of ad hoc elements. But so are leximin and aggregation. Further-
more, given the presence of leximin, the Hirosean method is not even the 
only one that non-aggregatively determines that X < Z, and therefore not 
strictly necessary for concluding that it is right to rescue the larger group. 
That said, what considerations are there for us to take as reason to adopt this, 
but not that, particular value-judgment criterion? 
Hirose says that we might have to opt for a principle other than Impar-
tiality or Pareto, such as leximin, to argue for a moral duty we believe exists 
when we otherwise do not know what to do (2015: 163-65). Again, he does 
not mention why, and this encourages me to suspect that he thought we 
would need to switch from Impartiality and Pareto because they do not tell us 
what to do (whereas the alternative does). But he needs to offer independent 
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reasons, or reasons other than that we would then be told to save the greater 
number, for us to adopt such and such methods for value judgments. 
Or, one might ask, does he? He proposes an elegant principle that 
counts in favor of a situation that many of us believe we ought to take ac-
tions that lead to. Is that not enough? It would be a good thing for him to 
explain why we should accept the principle, but it is not a must. He effective-
ly showed us that not all consequentialists need be aggregationists, shedding 
brighter light on the taxonomy of moral theories. Thanks to him, we have 
come to remind ourselves of how diverse factors can constitute a conse-
quence in a variety of manners, and how even consequentialists can sharply 
disagree over ways of understanding consequences. 
This response is surely open to Hirose. But it would enable him to win 
only a Pyrrhic victory. Philosophers who have fought against the number 
skepticism championed by Taurek do not simply want to understand how it 
could possibly be true that it is right to save the greater number; rather, their 
aim is to show that we have reason to believe so – even when we do not 
combine the interests of different individuals. Now the response in question 
forsakes this very central project of the philosophers in the pro-numbers 
camp. Even in exchange for the right to maintain that the method by means 
of which he reaches his conclusion is correct, that seems too expensive a 
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4 I am indebted to Kye Hoon Jung, Changwon Sung and the anonymous referee for the 
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy for their helpful comments. An earlier version of this dis-
cussion note was presented at the Korean Society for the Philosophy of Science and the 
Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy Joint Summer Conference in July 2016. 
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